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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

)

Plaintiff/Appellee,

]
])

vs.
CHRIS CASTILLO,

Case No. 20060811-CA

;

Defendant/Appellant.

]

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a finding of guilty by a jury in the Second District
Court for Aggravated Assault, a third-degree felony, and Possession of a
Dangerous Weapon by a Restricted Person, a second-degree felony.

The

Defendant entered a guilty plea on August 7, 2006, and was sentenced that
same day to serve an indeteraiinate term of zero to five years at the Utah State
Prison and a concurrent indeterminate term of one to fifteen years at the Utah
State Prison.

The Defendant entered the plea pursuant to the case of State v.

Seiy, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). This Court has jurisdiction over this
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 78-2a-3(2)(e)(2004).

ISSUE u.\ vFPhAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
POINT I
DID THE TRIAL COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
WHEN IT RULED, PURSUANT TO A MOTION IN
LIMINE, THAT IT WOULD ALLOW EVIDENCE TO BE
PRESENTED TO THE JURY THAT A FIREARM WAS
FOUND 172 DAYS AFTER THE ALLEGED DATE OF
THE CRIME.
Standard of Review:

This issue should be reviewed under an abuse of

discretion standard of review. "The trial court's ultimate ruling under Rule 403
of the Utah Rules of Evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion." State v.
Gulbransen 106 P.3d 7345 740 (Utah 2005). This issue was preserved when
Defendant's attorney filed a motion in limine (R. 068-071).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
11. S. CONSTITUTION
Sixth Amendment
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defence.
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CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF UTAH
Article I Section 12
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to
be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is alleged
to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall
any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance money or
fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled
to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify
against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any person be
twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination,
the function of that examination is limited to determining whether probable
cause exists unless otherwise provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution
shall preclude the use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute or rule
in whole or in part at any preliminary examination to determine probable cause
or at any pretrial proceeding with respect to release of the defendant if
appropriate discovery is allowed as defined by statute or rule.

UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
§76-5-103, Aggravated assault
(1)

A person commits aggravated assault if he commits assault as defined in
Section 76-5-102 and he:
(a)
(b)

(2)

intentionally causes serious bodily injury to another; or
under circumstances not amounting to a violation of Subsection
(l)(a), uses a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601 or
other means or force likely to produce death or serious bodily
injury.

A violation of Subsection (l)(a) is a second degree felony.

(3)

A violation of Subsection (1 )(b) is a third degree felony.

$76-10-503. Possession of a dangerous Weapon by a Restricted Person:
Restrictions on possession, purchase, transfer, and ownership of dangerous
weapons by certain persons
(1) For purposes of this section:
(a)

(b)

A Category I restricted person is a person who:
(i)
has been convicted of any violent felony as defined in
Section 76-3-203.5;
(ii) is on probation or parole for any felony;
(iii) is on parole from a secure facility as defined in Section
62A-7-101;or
(iv) within the last ten years has been adjudicated delinquent for
an offense which if committed by an adult would have been
a violent felony as defined in Section 76-3-203.5.
A Category II restricted person is a person who:
(i)
has been convicted of or is under indictment for any felony;
(ii) within the last seven years has been adjudicated delinquent
for an offense which if committed by an adult would have
been a felony;
(iii) is an unlawful user of a controlled substance as defined in
Section 58-37-2;
(iv) is in possession of a dangerous weapon and is knowingly
and intentionally in unlawful possession of a Schedule I or
II controlled substance as defined in Section 58-37-2;
(v) has been found not guilty by reason of insanity for a felony
offense;
(vi) has been found mentally incompetent to stand trial for a
felony offense;
(vii) has been adjudicated as mentally defective as provided in
the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, Pub. L. No.
103-159, 107 Stat. 1536 (1993), [FN1] or has been
committed to a mental institution;
(viii) is an alien who is illegally or unlawfully in the United
States;
(ix) has been dishonorably discharged from the armed forces; or
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(x)

(2)

has renounced his citizenship after having been a citizen of
the United States.

A Category I restricted person who intentionally or knowingly agrees,
consents, offers, or arranges to purchase, transfer, possess, use, or have
under his custody or control, or who intentionally or knowingly
purchases, transfers, possesses, uses, or has under his custody or control:
(a)
(b)

(3)

any firearm is guilty of a second degree felony; or
any dangerous weapon other than a firearm is guilty of a third
degree felony.
A Category II restricted person who purchases, transfers, possesses, uses,
or has under his custody or control:
(a)
(b)

any firearm is guilty of a third degree felony; or
any dangerous weapon other than a firearm is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor.

(4)

A person may be subject to the restrictions of both categories at the same
time.

(5)

If a higher penalty than is prescribed in this section is provided in
another section for one who purchases, transfers, possesses, uses, or has
under this custody or control any dangerous weapon, the penalties of that
section control.

(6)

It is an affirmative defense to a charge based on the definition in
Subsection (l)(b)(iv) that the person was:
(a)

(b)

in possession of a controlled substance pursuant to a lawful order
of a practitioner for use of a member of the person's household or
for administration to an animal owned by the person or a member
of the person's household; or
otherwise authorized by law to possess the substance.

§78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction.
2)

The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over:
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(a)

(j)

the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative
proceedings of state agencies or appeals from the district court
review of informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies,
except the Public Service Commission, State Tax Commission,
School and Institutional Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division
of Forestry, Fire and State Lands actions reviewed by the
executive director of the Department of Natural Resources, Board
of Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer;
cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court.

UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE
RULE 403. EXCLUSION OF RELEVANT EVIDENCE ON GROUNDS
OF PREJUDICE, CONFUSION, OR WASTE OF TIME
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Defendant was charged by Information with Aggravated Assault, a
third-degree felony, a violation of U.C.A. §76-5-103, and Possession of a
Dangerous Weapon by a Restricted Person, a second-degree felony, a violation
of U.C.A. §76-10-503. The Defendant pled not guilty and filed a motion in
limine to exclude evidence found by the police some 172 days after the alleged
assault had occurred (R. 068-071). The trial court denied this motion. (Mot.
Hearing. Tr. 8).

6

On August 7, 2006, based on the trial court's ruling on the motion in
limine, the Defendant entered an Alford plea to the two charges listed above,
specifically reserving his right to appeal pursuant to State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935
(Utah Ct. App. 1988).

The Defendant was sentenced on August 7, 2006, to

serve an indeterminate term of zero to five years at the Utah State Prison and a
concurrent indeterminate term of one to fifteen years at the Utah State Prison.
The Sentence, Judgment and Commitment was signed on August 7, 2006. A
Notice of Appeal was filed on August 14, 2006. (R. 084-085).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The motion in limine in this case was argued on July 31,2006, with both parties
subletting the case on stipulated facts. (R. 100). These facts indicated that on the date
alleged, Officer Hammond responded to the area of the Wonder Bread Bakery in
Ogden, Utah, on a report to 911 of a man with a firearm. Officer Hammond
claimed that he observed a man fitting the description of this individual and
began pursuing. The individual ran and kept turning around and pointing at
Officer Hammond what he described as silver, semiautomatic pistol. (R.
100/6).
Another witness at the scene was an employee in the Wonder Bread
parking lot that encountered this individual and claims that within a distance of
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ten to fifteen feet away the individual also pointed a weapon at him which he
also described as a silver, very large, shiny semiautomatic handgun. (R. 100/6).
Officer Hammond lost track of the individual for approximately 20
seconds. When he apprehended the individual, who was identified as the
Defendant, a search was undertaken in the area of the parking lot where the
officer saw him disappear. Despite the efforts of several police officers utilizing
rakes and a canine search dog, as well as the efforts of several Wonder Bread
employees, the weapon could not be located. (R. 100/2). Approximately 172
days later a weapon that generally fit the description given by Officer
Hammond and the other individual was found in the park strip outside the
Wonder Bread bakery underneath some trees. (R. 100/2).

All parties

acknowledge that this area was located in a high crime region and was
accessible to the general public. (R. 100/3).
While examining the weapon it was determined that someone had filed off
the serial number. Apparently the serial number was raised by CSI, and a
search of the national weapons database revealed no information as to it being
stolen or any information linking it to the Defendant. (R. 100/3).

The

Defendant acknowledged running from the officer, but he has consistently
maintained that he did not possess the firearm and did not threaten anyone with
a weapon.

8

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The trial court denied the Defendant's motion in limine to exclude
evidence of the weapon discovered 172 days after the alleged crime had
occurred. This evidence, although somewhat relevant to the charge, was highly
prejudicial and highly suspect. The trial court should have determined that any
probative value was substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice.
Based on the highly prejudicial effect of this evidence and the substantial
danger that a jury would disregard the obviously tenuous link of the weapon to
the Defendant, the Defendant elected to enter into a plea negotiation reserving
the right to appeal this decision.
ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN
IT RULED, PURSUANT TO A MOTION IN LIMINE,
THAT IT WOULD ALLOW EVIDENCE TO BE
PRESENTED TO THE JURY THAT A GUN WAS FOUND
AT THE SCENE OF THE CRIME 172 DAYS AFTER THE
ALLEGED DATE OF THE CRIME.
Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence states that relevant, "evidence
may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury..."
U.R.E. 403 (2004). When determining admissibility under Rule 403, trial
courts must "weigh its probative value against its tendency to unfairly prejudice
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the defendant." State v. Jamison, 767 P.2d 134, 137 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
"Unfair prejudice" means "an undue tendency to suggest decision on an
improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one." State v.
Maurer, 770 P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 1989).
In State v. Maurer, 110 P.2d 981 (Utah 1989), the defendant was
convicted of second-degree murder. Thirty-eight days after the homicide the
defendant wrote the victim's father a letter from the jail. The letter said among
other things that the defendant was glad he killed the victim. He said that it
"was a great feeling to watch her die." The defendant signed the letter, "The
killer, John H. Maurer." Id. at 982.
The defendant filed a motion in limine to preclude the State from
introducing the letter into evidence. The trial court denied the motion and
found that the letter was probative of the defendant's state of mind at the time
of the homicide and would assist the jury in determining whether the defendant
was guilty of murder or manslaughter. Id.
The defendant argued on appeal that even if the letter had some
relevance, the prejudicial effect of the letter far exceeded its potential relevance
under Rule 403. Id. at 983. Both the defendant and the State agreed that the
central issue at the trial was the defendant's state of mind at the time he killed
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the victim. Id. The Supreme Court found that "the balance of the letter reflects
defendant's state of mind at the time the letter was written." Id.
The Court recognized that it was "cognizant of the rule that the appraisal
of the probative and prejudicial value of evidence under Rule 403 is generally
entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial judge and will not be upset on
appeal absent manifest error." Id. The Court went on to state that "any
relevance which could be found therein was greatly and clearly outweighed by
the danger of 'unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, [and] misleading the
jury." Id. The Supreme Court concluded that the trial court's admission of the
entire letter was clearly erroneous. Id.
The Supreme Court stated that "[s]ince all effective evidence is
prejudicial in the sense of being damaging to the party against whom it is
offered, prejudice which calls for exclusion is given a more specialized
meaning:" Id. at 984. The Court then listed "an undue tendency to suggest
decision on an improper basis, . . . such as bias, sympathy, hatred, contempt,
retribution or horror. Where a danger of unfair prejudice is perceived, the
degree of likely prejudice must also be considered." Id.
In Maurer, the Supreme Court stated that "[t]he mere fact that evidence
possesses a tendency to suggest a decision upon an improper basis does not
require exclusion; evidence may be excluded only if the danger of unfair
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prejudice substantially outweighs the probative value of the proffered
evidence." State v. Maurer, 770 P.2d at 984.
The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States
guarantees a criminal defendant the right to an impartial jury. Likewise, Article
I Section 12 of the Constitution of the State of Utah requires an impartial jury
for a criminal defendant.
These constitutional protections were addressed in the case of State v.
Kell, 2002 UT 106 at p 0 , 61 P.3d 1019. The Utah Supreme Court held:
Although rule 403 contains a presumption of admissibility of
evidence, evidence that has "an unusually strong propensity to
unfairly prejudice, inflame, or mislead a jury" will be deemed
inadmissible. State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1256 (Utah 1988).
Inadmissible evidence may include gruesome photographs of a
homicide victim's corpse, evidence of a rape victim's past sexual
activities with someone other than the accused, and statistical
evidence of matters not susceptible to quantitative analysis, such
as witness veracity.
(R. 100)
In State v. Bluff, 2002 UT 66, % 59, 52 P.3d 1210 (Utah 2002), the Utah
Supreme Court stated that when deciding whether the risk of unfair prejudice
under Rule 403 substantially outweighs the probative value, a number of
factors need to be considered, including "the strength of the evidence as to the
commission of the other crime," and "the degree to which the evidence will
rouse the jury to overmastering hostility." {Id. at *[[ 59) The court went on to
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state that "[e]ven though we have applied these factors in the past to 'causes/
we think they are equally applicable to determine the effect of a 'wrong act' as
described in Rule 403." Id.
The Utah Supreme Court has further held that evidence of a defendant's
prior bad acts can violate Rule 403 due to the prejudicial effect such evidence
may carry to a jury. In State v. Saunders, 699 P.2d 738 (Utah 1985), the Utah
Supreme Court stated that "[t]he bases of these limitations on the admissibility
of evidence of prior crimes is the tendency of a fact finder to convict the
accused because of bad character rather than because he is shown to be guilty
of the offenses charged. Because of this tendency, such evidence is presumed
prejudicial and, absent a reason for the admission of the evidence other than to
show criminal disposition, the evidence is excluded." Id. at 741
In the case at bar, the evidence that a weapon generally fitting the
description of a gun the two State's witnesses claimed to have seen would be
highly prejudicial. The problems that arises in this case is that the evidence of
the gun found 172 days after the alleged offense would almost certainly be
given an inordinate amount of weight by a jury. Just as the evidence of prior
convictions may be improperly utilized in obtaining a conviction, the evidence
that a gun was found at the scene would be tempting for a jury to utilize to find
the Defendant guilty.
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The problem is that the probative value is virtually nonexistent. In the
case a bar, the fact that a weapon generally matching the description of the
weapon claimed to have been used at the scene was found nearly six months
after the fact is highly suspect. The fact that it happens to match the general
description of the witness's weapon is not unusual since hundreds of models of
handguns are silver semiautomatic. The chance that this gun was ever held by
the Defendant is speculative at best. The ability of the Defendant to refute the
connection is not feasible. This is not because there is a high likelihood that the
gun was the Defendant's, but rather because the passage of 172 days made the
ability to fingerprint the weapon impossible. This leaves the Defendant in an
untenable position. He could either tiy to brush off the evidence and hope the
jury would disregard the prosecutor's efforts to link this gun to the Defendant,
or he could attack this evidence during cross-examination of the State's
witness. The problem with attempting a vigorous cross-examination is the
danger that the jury may apply the old Shakespeare line, "The lady protests too
much Methinks." (Hamlet, act 3, sc. 2, 1. 219 (1604)). In either scenario the
Defendant faces a high probability that he will lose.
The problem in the present case is that the presence of a gun is seminal
to the entire case. Without a gun the prosecutors would be unable to convict the
Defendant on the charge of possession of weapon by a restricted person. The
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absence of a gun would also eliminate the possibility of a finding of guilt to the
aggravated assault.
The Defendant believes that the prejudicial effect of this evidence far
outweighs the probative value, and therefore this Court should find that the trial
court abused its discretion in denying the Defendant's motion to exclude this
evidence. The harmfulness of this evidence is obvious, since without the gun
the prosecution is left with a case of a couple of eyewitnesses without any
supportive evidence. The Defendant could then argue that the absence of a gun,
despite rigorous efforts to find the same raises reasonable doubt. The problem
is that a jury is not sophisticated enough to separate the prejudicial effect of the
later found weapon from the limited probative value it brings. The jury would
not be able to recognize the fact that it would not be unusual for a gun to be
found in the relatively large area in question during a six-month period in a
high crime area.
CONCLUSION
The trial court did not properly consider the high probability that the
prejudicial effect of this evidence outweighed any minimal probative value this
evidence could have presented to a jury. For these reasons the trial court
abused its discretion when it denied the Defendant's motion in limine to
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exclude this evidence.

Therefore, the Defendant's conviction should be

reversed, and this matter should be remanded to the trial courtier-a^new trial.
DATED this ^_ day of January 2007.

RANDALL W. I&CHARD5
Att omey for Appellant
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Floor, PO Box 140854, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-O1807, postage/;
7_ day of January 2007.
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W. klCHARDS \
Attorney at Law
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AUG 1 - VQQfi
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
ORAL ARGUMENT
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs

Case No: 051905870 FS

CHRISTOPHER SIMON CASTILLO,
Defendant.

Judge:
Date:

ROGER S DUTSON
August 7, 2 006

PRESENT
Clerk:
carier
Prosecutor: LYON, NATHAN D
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney (s) : MARTIN GRAVIS, PDA
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: June 23, 1976
Video
Tape Number:
DO8070 6
Tape Count: 33 0
CHARGES
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT (amended) - 3rd Degree
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 08/07/2006
POSSESSION OF A DNGR WEAP BY RESTRICTED Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 08/07/2006

Felony
Guilty
2nd Degree Felony
Guilty

HEARING
This is time set for oral argument. The defendant is present in
custody from the Utah State Prison with counsel. Negotiations have
been reached.
The defendant enters an Alford plea to count #1, F3-Aggravated
Assault and to count 443, F2-Possession of Dngr Weap by Restricted
Person as he intends to appeal this matter.
State moves to dismiss all remaining charges, including the
enhancement charge. Court grants.
The Court accepts the Alford plea and enters the conviction. A
plea agreement is submitted and signed in open Court. The defendant
waives time for sentencing. Court grants and proceeds with
Page 1

Case No: 051905870
Date:
Aug 07, 2 006
sentencing.
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED ASSAULT a 3rd
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term
of not to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison.
Based on the defendant's conviction of POSSESSION OF A DNGR WEAP BY
RESTRICTED a 2nd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an
indeterminate term of not less than one year nor more than fifteen
years in the Utah State Prison.
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately.
To the WEBER County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the
defendant will be confined.
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE
The sentence imposed in each count shall run concurrently with one
another and concurrently with any ouher sentencing being served.

Dated this

day of

KOGER Jg buTSON
^
Distract Court Judge

Page 2 (last)
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